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On Union soil
Lucid and engrossing narrative offers surprises
In Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg
Campaign, we have an interesting, fast-paced, and efficient narration of the
battle and campaign. The author, Steven E. Woodworth, an associate professor
of History at Texas Christian University and general editor of a series of books
on the Civil War era, states at the outset that his book relies much more than
usual on secondary sources; and the advantages and drawbacks of using
relatively few, and recent, books on the subject are readily apparent in Beneath
a Northern Sky.
Readers should not skip the brief preface, because it both effectively invites
readers into what will be an engaging narrative, and alerts him or her to the
necessity of thinking critically while reading the narrative. There is a predictable
reference to Gettysburg as having spawned a voluminous literature, followed by
a valid justification of presenting a new book meant for those just embarking on
their study of Gettysburg and those who desire a summary overview of the
recent scholarship. Unfortunately, that summary is presented as narrative; i.e., a
novice reader would not know when he or she is receiving the results of a
long-standing scholarly consensus or when the narrative is reflective of the
controversial opinions of a few recent writers. Readers need to be wary at the
outset, as Woodworth states that Gettysburg proved . . . the near impossibility of
decisive action in the eastern theater û reinforced by later references to the East
as a sideshow compared to the war in the West. This is not only unproven by
Gettysburg, but also not provable at all: just consider the possible results of a
stunning Confederate victory at Gettysburg as was achieved at Second
Manassas.
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Such caveats notwithstanding, the early sections of the book make Beneath
a Northern Sky worth the price (of the paperback edition). Woodworth is not
intimidated by long-standing mythology pertaining to either side in the war. This
is perhaps the chief advantage of his using a relatively shallow foreground of
secondary sources. For example, he views Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of
Northern Virginia objectively, rather than through the cameo lens of that army's
legendary invincibility: referring to the war in the West, Woodworth remarks
that Ulysses S. Grant . . . [led] a Union army whose confidence and striking
power matched that of Lee's own. Of much greater importance, however, is
Woodworth's devotion of a full chapter to Lee's army's plundering in
Pennsylvania. Several pages of quotations from Confederate soldiers themselves
show that indeed the Army of Northern Virginia intended to supply itself at will
and at the expense of Northern citizens, paying, when paying at all, in worthless
Confederate money. Lee's order mandating restraint had a definite purpose,
according to Woodward: to make the Confederacy appear more virtuous than the
Union û an appearance successfully conveyed down to the present day, as
portrayed by both books and film. However, the Confederate commanding
general is shown by Woodward as ignoring his own order; and Woodward
concludes that the Army of Northern Virginia's record in Pennsylvania was
comparable to the one Union armies would compile during the war when they
marched through various parts of the South. But the author reminds us that the
Confederate army in Pennsylvania was a scourge far worse than any troops who
ever marched behind William Tecumseh Sherman, and that was in kidnapping
free citizens and carrying them off into slavery. Confederate officers as high as
corps command level are noted to have issued instructions for the abduction of
African Americans. One witness is quoted as seeing blacks from her town driven
by just like we would drive cattle, observing that most were women and
children, and wondering what the Rebels want with those little babies.'
Woodworth concludes that this was plundering with an ideological bent and a
reminder of why the two sides were fighting and what the real issue was between
them.
The decisions made by each army's high command leading to the meeting at
Gettysburg are clearly recounted. Some readers will be surprised to see that the
Union commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, is considered to have been only
adequate. New to army command, Meade is pictured as somewhat hesitant in
decision-making and tardy in approaching the field. Elsewhere, and in his
correspondence and orders, Meade can be seen as surprisingly aggressive and
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol5/iss3/6

2

Gramm: Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaig

decisive. Equally surprising is the author's favorable treatment of Maj. Gen. O.
O. Howard, whose placement of the Eleventh Corps, less than firm control of the
battlefield, and somewhat questionable attitude when Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott
Hancock arrived to supercede him have received criticism by many analysts of
the battle. The commander of the Union Twelfth Corps, whose name, Slocum,
has prompted critics then and now to call him Slow Come, is not seen here as
negligent or overly attentive to his own reputation in refraining from
immediately marching his corps toward the sound of the guns, but is treated by
Woodworth as a competent and professional officer -- as indeed he was
everywhere else in the war. The nature and importance of the stand of the First
Corps in general, and of some units of the Eleventh Corps, are given full play in
the book (though both somewhat compressed); and the brave and persistent
Confederate assaults are presented forcefully. Especially well done is
Woodworth's recounting of the last moments of Sergeant Amos Humiston of
New York, whose orphaned children's photograph was displayed all across the
Union following the battle. (The children became the first residents, and their
mother the first caretaker, of the orphans' home established in Gettysburg
consequent to the publicity arising from the Humiston story.) The continuing
controversy regarding whether Confederate General Ewell, or General Lee
himself, was responsible for the Army of Northern Virginia's not making a final
push to dislodge the defenders of Cemetery Hill is concluded quickly with the
correct observation that Lee was in command and present in person on the
battlefield. However, the question of whether or not another attack should have
been made is untreated û as is probably appropriate in a short book.
However, controversial judgment is not avoided in the narratives of days
two and three of the battle. Again, both days are described in well-paced
chapters, supplied with pertinent and effective quotations from participants. The
ad hoc and sometimes confusing series of engagements on the Union left flank
during the second day's fighting are described clearly and compellingly.
However, the author has adopted for his narrative's point of view a highly critical
assessment of Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. He is depicted as slow,
sluggish, and less than fully cooperative with his commanding general on day
two. Harsh criticism of Longstreet has a long and inglorious tradition, beginning
with Confederate General Jubal Early, who among other things probably was
trying to cover up his own failings at Gettysburg. Woodworth revives this
generally discredited tradition, relying perhaps on one somewhat idiosyncratic
author in particular, and presents it as fact. Longstreet, we read on page 107,
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disliked and distrusted Lee, largely because he was jealous of him. Such an
opinion reads back into Gettysburg the statements Longstreet wrote after the war
in response to the vicious and dishonorable goading he was receiving by Early
and others who were attempting to shift blame for loss of the great battle from
Lee to someone else, preferably not themselves. Longstreet is called sullen and
desirous of delaying the Confederate attack; but these are egregious judgments
made against a professional soldier, whose actions elsewhere leave no doubt of
his commitment to victory. Worse yet, Longstreet is pictured as willing to
sabotage his commander's efforts on day three.
Lee wanted to attack the Union center on the third day, but Longstreet had
other ideas -- of course. In fact, we are told, Longstreet did not want anyone to
believe this attack would succeed. Even if this opinion were correct, it would
still be merely an opinion and should have been presented as such. A longer
book could summarize the evidence on both sides of the Longstreet controversy;
likewise a book with a longer view of sources would not present tenuous and
extreme assumptions as elements of an otherwise effective narrative.
That there is insufficient depth of sources behind this book comes out in
some small ways as well. Union general Lysander Cutler is referred to as Lyman
Cutler twice, Warfield Ridge on the south end of the battlefield is referred to as
nameless, and two well-known photographs are misidentified. (Both are from the
south end of the battlefield: one is captioned as having been taken near
McPherson's Woods, several miles away; the other is captioned as being from
the Wheatfield, a quarter mile distant.) All books contain these types of small
flaws, and these are relatively minor. Perhaps of somewhat more importance is a
quotation from a letter by Confederate general William Dorsey Pender, to the
effect that in the invasion, the people of the North would now feel the hard hand
of war. Quoted from a secondary source, the statement lacks context. Familiarity
with Pender's letters would show that one might read his statement not as a
vigorous justification of invasion, but as part of a long and thoughtful
rumination, full of misgivings, related to the morality of invading the North.
The book is lucid and engrossing. Occasionally, however, it is as if the
seriousness of the subject is forgotten. On page 92 we read of an attack that
enveloped a line of defenders and squashed them like bugs. Later it is stated
somewhat fatuously, Sharpshooters on both sides were playing for keeps. But
with the exception of the rare misstep, descriptions are vivid, and quotations by
witnesses are well-placed û as in the following moment during the Confederate
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attack on the Iron Brigade making their last stand in front of the Lutheran
Seminary buildings: Their ranks went down like grass before a scythe,' a soldier
of the Nineteenth Indiana later recalled. They lay in piles before us,' wrote a
Wisconsin soldier. That these phrases long ago became familiar to readers does
not make them anything less than necessary here, as pictures of the nature of
war. For such reminders, and for placing the battle of Gettysburg in its proper
context û as well as for its exposition of the battle û Beneath a Northern Sky is
worthwhile reading.
Kent Gramm, a professor at Wheaton College (IL), is Program Director for
the Seminary Ridge Foundation in Gettysburg, and the author of Gettysburg: A
Meditation on War and Values, November: Lincoln's Elegy at Gettysburg, and
Somebody's Darling: Essays on the Civil War.
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